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A B S T R A C T
We develop a framework for analyzing the role of public agencies in making high-risk investments along the
innovation chain and ask how both the risks of innovation and the rewards can be shared between public and
private actors. We build on a new approach to innovation policy, which we call market co-creating and shaping, in
which the state is not only fixing markets but actively co-creating them. We also look at the legal institutions that
determine (and are determined by) the relationship between public and private actors. Policy measures to in-
stitutionalize rewards in a way that promote more equitable public–private partnerships can be understood as
attempts to mediate asymmetric power relations, tensions and conflicting views among multiple stakeholders, as
well as building a shared notion of the value and legitimacy of the role of the state. We conclude by outlining
analytical and policy implications and identifying avenues for future research.
1. Introduction
The last fifty years have witnessed the emergence of several dis-
ruptive technological innovations – from ICT to biotech and, more re-
cently, renewable energy – that have involved profound institutional
changes and brought unprecedented levels of value creation. This has
required both public and private investments across the entire in-
novation chain. However, while the private risk-taking has been re-
cognized and elaborated through attention to ‘entrepreneurship’ (Acs
and Audretsch, 2005) and wealth creation, public investments have
remained framed in the context of fixing market failures (Samuelson,
1997). The idea that innovation is led by private entrepreneurs who
benefit at most from horizontal market fixing funding (infrastructure,
skills, grants) has prevailed in the theory and rhetoric behind innova-
tion policy.1
The market failure view of government funding has a particular
understanding of returns. While private enterprises deserve the ‘profit’
created, public organizations can gain by focusing on spillovers that
emerge from wealth creation. That is, from a societal standpoint, as
long as adequate framework conditions are in place, the advantages of
optimal levels of public spending in R&D confined to fixing markets,
will occur through the creation of ‘social returns’ such as knowledge
spilovers and public goods, better quality and cheaper goods and ser-
vices (‘consumer surplus’), and job creation, ultimately resulting in
economic growth and positive fiscal impact.
Yet what is increasingly evident from the literature on the devel-
opmental state (Block and Keller, 2011) and the entrepreneurial state
(Mazzucato, 2013) is that the state does much more than fix market
failures. It has taken on some of the highest risk investments along the
entire innovation chain, not limited to upstream R&D but also, for ex-
ample, the provision of downstream patient long term finance in the
forms of grants and loans to companies. Indeed, the various public
policy instruments that led to Silicon Valley, are hardly just market
fixing: they have actively created markets. This begs the question
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whether the assumptions of how risks and rewards are shared in
mainstream literature needs a revision to better take into account the
more active level of risk-taking played by the state. To be sure, the point
here is not to argue for a more active role of the state but to ask whether
its current risk-taking role is taken into account when assuming the
distribution of the rewards.
Mazzucato (2013) made a step to fill this gap by illustrating the
immense public investment that have provided the foundation for the
success of companies like Google and Apple (e.g. all the technologies
like the Internet, GPS, and Siri in smart products are funded by the
public sector). She argued that the state could become wiser in its
distribution of rewards so that both risks and rewards are socialized.
Instruments proposed included equity, royalties and conditions of re-
investment. Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) built on this work by of-
fering a comprehensive framework named the ‘risk–reward nexus’ to
investigate the relationship between how risks are taken in innovation
and how the rewards are distributed. Their main argument is that the
collective, cumulative and inherently uncertain nature of innovation
processes enables the dissociation between the risks taken and rewards
realized by different types of economic actors – workers, citizens (re-
presented by the state) and shareholders. A particular focus of their
analysis was on the way that the pharmaceutical companies have been
able to freeride on the back of high-risk funding from organizations like
the National Institutes of Health—without the public contribution being
taken into account when (1) pricing drugs, (2) governing patents, and
(3) distributing returns to shareholders (see Mazzucato et al., 2018).
The authors focused on the strategies that allow financial actors to
position themselves along the innovation chain and extract more value
than their contributions could have generated on their own, at the
expense of the other actors.
This paper complements these studies by looking at the relationship
between the role of the state as an investor and the extent to which
public funding agencies attempt to reap a share of financial rewards
realized in partnerships with business. This analysis builds on a new
framework – market co-creating and shaping – in which the state is a
leading actor and entrepreneur working in close collaboration with the
private sector and is therefore endogenous to economic processes
(Mazzucato, 2016, 2013). We adopt a perspective that highlights the
constitutive role of the state, in the institutional shaping of market re-
lations, society and the state itself, which some scholars have referred
to as ‘legal Institutionalism’ (Hodgson, 2015; Deakin et al., 2017). This
approach makes it possible to go beyond the notion of legal rules and
contracts as background incentives for profit-maximizing agents, and to
assess their quality in terms of the potential for shifting the nature,
goals or meanings of economic activity and organization to deliver
increased wellbeing (Stryker, 2003). Bringing these economic and legal
angles together allows us to better analyze and comprehend the dy-
namics of public–private partnerships concerning risk-and-reward dis-
tributions.
Our aims are two-fold. One is to provide an analytical foundation
that enables to reframe innovation policy efforts related to the ri-
sk–reward nexus. By conceptualizing the institutionalization of reward
structures as a social, legal and political process – rather than an op-
timal end-point – the new framework should help researchers and de-
cision-makers identify some of the relevant dilemmas. The second aim
is to advance knowledge that can guide better policy tools and practices
towards socializing the risks and rewards of public investments, to
promote inclusive, innovation-led growth. Hence, this framework op-
erates at the level of a mid-range theory akin to policy guidance, as
opposed to abstract or general theory (George and Bennett, 2005).
In Section 2 we review the market failure approach to innovation
policy and its main shortcomings, with reference to some alternative
frameworks. In Section 3 we introduce three bodies of literature that lay
the foundations for a new approach: (i) the developmental state, (ii)
legal institutionalism and (iii) the entrepreneurial state. In Section 4 we
ask how the state can capture a share of the rewards that better reflects
its role as a risk-taker. We conclude the paper by outlining analytical
and policy implications, and areas for future research.
2. The market failure approach to innovation policy and its main
shortcomings
Within the neoclassical economic framework, innovation policy is
viewed as fit for correcting market failures, stemming from the notion
that ‘free’ market interactions play a prominent role in the economy.
The production function is the conceptual model of value creation
within firms, wherein the use of labor and capital inputs produces new
products and services. As the primary organizer of production and
owner of the capital assets involved, the private sector is the leading
entrepreneur. Government’s role is to guarantee the necessary condi-
tions for markets to operate and to intervene in the economy to correct
‘market failures’.
Regarding innovation, market failures involve under- or over-in-
vestment by business. A classic example refers to the ‘public good’
nature of basic research, which offers insufficient incentives for firms to
invest given the high spillover effects, making it difficult to appropriate
returns (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). There is also asymmetric or in-
complete information in the financial markets, which increases the cost
for firms – especially SMEs – to finance R&D (Hall and Lerner, 2010).
Eventually, investments in certain areas exceed the desirable levels, for
instance when negative externalities such as those created by patent
races, pollution or traffic congestion take place (Stiglitz, 2000). The
government’s direct financing has a limited role in fixing those pro-
blems and should focus on scientific research and SMEs. As public
funding moves downstream, it receives more criticism, because, in
theory, spillover effects are not as significant as those that occur up-
stream, and companies are in a better position to capture returns.
The expectation of achieving high social benefit through public
funding is vital for legitimizing innovation policy. And again, despite
the skepticism about the state’s ability to do so effectively, the fact
remains that many public–private partnerships lead to commercial
success, yielding high financial rewards that the government may not
be able to appropriate. The assumption is that government’s role in
fixing markets naturally generates a return through welfare increases
and economic growth. As a result, the benefits to society – the ‘social
returns’ – are new and better goods at reduced prices for consumers
(‘consumer surplus’), ‘public good’ provision, knowledge spillovers and
new jobs. Also, these benefits reflect a positive fiscal position.
Supposing that supported companies and individuals pay their due
taxes, increased economic activity contributes to increased tax collec-
tion (one of the primary mechanisms through which the state recoups a
financial gain). While imperfections may block or reduce the optimal
social rate of return, these are just imperfections for government to fix.
In short, because this approach is based upon the perception that public
funding is a passive tool for boosting private entrepreneurship, gov-
ernments tend to pay insufficient attention to how to appropriate the
rewards of public investment.
Implicit here is also a limited view on the role of the state regarding
the rules underpinning market interactions and the underlying written
or informal contracts on which actors must agree. These rules and
contracts are crucial, however, as they ultimately define reward dis-
tributions between public and private actors. Assuming that economic
exchanges only happen among private owners, the state appears as an
external entity responsible for the rule of law. It helps the market
system operate at its best by ensuring robust and stable institutions
through well-defined property rights and rigorous contract enforcement
(Posner, 2014).
Accepting that only one best set of rules maximizes economic wel-
fare (Coase, 1960), economic analyses of contractual relationships have
mostly taken the underlying rules as given. Consequently, according to
the literature on new institutional economics, the role of government,
operating through courts, is at best limited to seeking efficient or
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aligned incentive structures that enable shareholder maximization and
transaction cost mitigation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). At worst, the
state is almost irrelevant and ineffective in filling gaps, correcting
contractual errors or settling any arising disputes (Williamson, 1988).
Even when the rules of the game are admittedly endogenous, the po-
litical, economic and social contexts reduce maneuvering room (North,
1990). Therefore, any policy guidance derived from this approach will
deal with removing legal barriers and strengthening the incentives for
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs.
The market failure framework for innovation policy has, however,
attracted significant criticism. The ‘systems of innovation’ literature
qualified that while substantial innovations happen within firms, they
depend on a complex network of actors, institutions and interactions
that influence the rate and pattern of knowledge creation and diffusion
across the economy (Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1995). Neo-Schumpe-
terian and evolutionary theory has highlighted that while neoclassical
economics examines existing landscapes (markets, sectors or technol-
ogies) and existing trajectories (whether firms are investing too little or
too much in a given area), it overlooks the dynamic and cumulative
process through which new landscapes and trajectories come about
(Dosi, 1982). It also neglects the range of actors that contribute to
changing them – in particular the related problems of alignment and
coordination –, and this is an area that has received increased attention
in the transformative innovation policy literature (Schot and
Steinmueller, 2018).
A significant shortcoming of the market failure approach, in the
context of the present article, is the passive role attributed to public
finance (Perez, 2003; Mazzucato, 2013). This has meant that the ap-
proach does not include the possibility of having an array of mechan-
isms, beyond taxation, that public agencies may deploy in order to
recoup a share of financial rewards of investments. Examples include
royalties on intellectual property rights (IPR) or sales and equity stakes
on supported firms. A related problem is the neglect of the state’s in-
fluence on the rules and contracts that underpin public–private part-
nerships, through legislators, regulators, courts (Pistor, 2009; Hodgson,
2015; Deakin et al., 2017) and funding agencies themselves (Mowery,
2009; Mazzucato, 2013; Hockett and Omarova, 2016). These short-
comings, and that the alternative frameworks reviewed in this section
do not explicitly discuss the distribution of risks and rewards,2 suggest
the need for a new conceptual framework for innovation policy that
extends the justification for public funding. Such a framework must
consider the risks taken by state actors, the legal grounds and proce-
dures for them, and the legal instruments adopted for capturing re-
wards.
3. Towards a new framework: market co-creating and shaping
Three bodies of literature lay the foundations for a new approach for
policy. These are on (i) the developmental state, (ii) legal in-
stitutionalism and (iii) the entrepreneurial state. The first draws on Karl
Polanyi’s insights on the nature of markets as socially embedded,
stressing the active and endogenous role of the state in economic
transformations (Polanyi, 1944). The second disentangles the collective
processes through which legal arrangements frame, influence, and
sustain the organization of the economy and the state. The third sheds
light on the risk-taking role of public actors as a driver of the rate and
direction of innovation.
Bridging these complementary and sometimes overlapping bodies of
literature allows for a richer understanding of the complexities, com-
plementarities, tensions and power relations underlying the dynamics
of public–private interactions in innovation. On this basis, the market
itself becomes an outcome to which the state, operating through mul-
tiple actors, makes a vital contribution (Mazzucato, 2016).
3.1. The developmental state
In his description of the emergence of capitalism, Polanyi (1944)
emphasizes that policies are not ‘interventions’, but that markets are
embedded in social and political institutions, and largely influenced by
them (Polanyi, 1944; Evans, 1995). Studies on the developmental state
have conceptualized and documented such an intrinsic and active state
leading profound transformations such as those involved in the devel-
opment of emerging East-Asian economies (see Amsden, 2001; Wade,
1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Chang (1999)). This ‘visible hand’ acts as a
capital provider and coordinator of industrialization and technical
change processes.
This literature has expanded into the concept of a developmental
network state, exposing the often hidden activity of public agencies that
also governs change in advanced economies (Ó Riain, 2004; Block,
2008; Block and Keller, 2011). While past industrialization experiences
targeted imitation and adaptation of existing technologies, the con-
temporary model puts innovation – R&D and commercialization – at the
center of competitive strategies. High-tech booms in countries like Is-
rael, Taiwan, Ireland and the United States exemplify policies en-
couraging activities that were not being done at all, working as devices
to revitalize the economy.
Another distinctive feature refers to the decentralized, ‘networked’
and flexible structures on which government relies (Ó Riain, 2004),
rather than the top-down, centralized organization exemplified by the
MITI, in Japan. Various types of public agencies operate by engaging in
direct and close partnerships with businesses (Block and Keller, 2011).
Public officials who have a problem-solving focus perform a range of
activities that do not fit under the market failure framework: targeting
resources in promising areas; opening windows that enable support for
other innovations; brokerage; and facilitation (such as providing in-
frastructure and standards). Such proactive stances can enable the
creation of new networks of collaboration or stimulate those that al-
ready exist. Hence, they are key to the accumulation and diffusion of
knowledge that drives technological change (Block, 2008, pp.
172–179).
3.2. Legal institutionalism
Drawing on various traditions,3 emerging studies serve to restore
the view on legal institutions – including the state – as playing a central,
constitutive role in capitalist societies and as a source of power
(Hodgson, 2015). The term ‘legal institutionalism’ has been used to
refer to this approach, which is still dispersed in the literature and does
not yet incorporate a fully structured theory (Deakin et al., 2017), but it
does offer useful insights on the interrelations between legal and eco-
nomic processes, policy and social change, otherwise obscured under
the notion of ‘embeddedness.’
From this perspective, legal arrangements that structure markets
and other institutions are outcomes rather than natural circumstances.
The interactions of legislators, courts and policymakers with a broader
group of actors, including firms and civil society, are indispensable for
sustaining legal rights and obligations. This is partly because the ef-
fectiveness of those arrangements also lies in shared norms and values
informing perceptions regarding their reasonableness, fairness, and
compliance with established rules (Commons, 1959). Enabling partici-
pation is important for legitimation in democratic environments. Legal
2 Different framings of innovation policy have, nonetheless, different im-
plications for the distribution of risks and rewards between actors in the public
and private sector.
3 The sources of inspiration range from legally grounded institutional analysis
e.g. Commons (1959) and Samuels (1989) – see Deakin et al. (2017) – to
contemporary institutional political economy studies e.g. Chang (2002a) and
Chang and Evans (2005) – see Coutinho (2017).
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institutionalism emphasizes that this interplay between state-dependent
and spontaneous legal developments (contingent on private interac-
tions, culture and custom) underpins essential institutions within ca-
pitalism, such as property, money, contracts, corporations and markets
(Hodgson, 2015). If law plays an integral part in capitalist societies, the
potential for shifting the nature, goals or meanings of economic ac-
tivity, and achieving enhanced equality, also have an expression in the
legal sphere (Stryker, 2003).
This view implies a crucial conceptual distinction. Law is part of
institutionalized power structures, but it is also an instrument for the
exercise of power and an expression of power itself (Deakin et al.,
2017); it is not just the mirror image of pre-existing power relations.
The state’s power is manifested through the actions of public officials in
the executive, legislative and judicial branches, which, under well-
grounded rules of their time, make decisions that define policies and
assign legal rights (Commons, 1959).
Similarly, the process of setting up systems of substantive rules,
contracts, procedures, routines and practices institutionalizes policy
goals. However, formalization is imperfect because there are always
gaps between written rules, their interpretation and practice. The out-
comes of state policy and legal choices are not neutral; they fit different
purposes, benefit particular interests, and frame which economic
(among other) performances are to be pursued (Samuels, 1989).4
Consequently, legal processes themselves become the arena of conflict
and power relations, unraveling through negotiation, bargaining and
compromising (Pistor, 2009).
A central contribution of legal institutionalism is to conceive of the
opportunities for advancing policy agendas as associated with partici-
pation in lawmaking, regulation and contracts. This is a view in which
it is claimed that law can (and must) be subject to intentional oper-
ationalization geared towards framing adequate and legitimate in-
stitutional arrangements in public policies (Coutinho, 2017). It follows
that the scope for shifting power relations in the economy largely de-
pends on (public) actors discovering how to effectively use the law to
advance their goals (Deakin et al., 2017). Therefore, successful policies
are also contingent upon experimentation in the legal domain.
3.3. The entrepreneurial state
Research on the entrepreneurial state challenges the received
wisdom that business is the only risk-taker (Mazzucato, 2013). It builds
on scholarship on industry dynamics, which offers a more refined view
of entrepreneurial phenomena, distinguishing progressive and re-
gressive characteristics affecting new firm entry to industry and per-
formance (Vivarelli, 2013). Firms act as profit-seekers driven by ex-
pectations about future opportunities that become clearer as the
innovation process unfolds (O’Sullivan, 2006). Recognizing that public
investments are a trigger for economic and technological opportunities,
Mazzucato (2013, 2016) has drawn attention to the roles that different
types of public actors and public finance may play in the risk landscape
(Fig. 1).
The concept of entrepreneurial state refers to the public sector’s
“willingness to invest in, and sometimes imagine from the beginning,
new high-risk areas before the private sector does” (Mazzucato, 2016,
p. 149). It supports an interpretation of the history of most important
contemporary technological breakthroughs, by showing that strategic
public investments often arrive early, absorbing major uncertainties
and long-term risks. They ultimately enable new industries to be taken
over by business only once profits are apparent. Examples include the
ICT revolution (Block and Keller, 2011), biotech (Lazonick and Tulum,
2011; Vallas et al., 2011), and emerging renewable energy industries
(Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017).
As far back as the 1930s, Schumpeter (1934) considered that new
markets created through innovation depended on inventiveness
(creating ‘new combinations’), entrepreneurship (envisioning business
opportunities and bringing inventions to market) and capital (providing
finance so entrepreneurs could control the production factors needed).
Noting that these roles may not necessarily be conflated in the same
individual or entity, Schumpeter made it clear that financiers are those
who put their capital at risk, not entrepreneurs as such.5 Therefore, in
Schumpeterian terms, especially in the initial capital-intensive stages of
technology development, the state is a leading financier in con-
temporary market economies, acting both as a capitalist (risk-taker)
and an entrepreneur (opportunity-driven). In light of this, Mazzucato
(2016) has argued that the role of the state is better understood as co-
creating and shaping markets, and not only fixing them.
Further insights derived from mission-oriented R&D literature in-
dicate that public risk-taking has a pervasive space dimension. Public
funding spans the entire innovation chain, reaching both the supply-
side – from basic to applied research and early-stage financing of
companies downstream – and the demand-side (Mowery, 2009; Foray
et al., 2012). Public resources operated in this way may play a catalytic
role if, beyond direct funding, policymakers embrace a systemic ap-
proach that includes complementary measures such as regulation and
taxes (Ergas, 1986).
Analysis of the entrepreneurial state leads to the argument that
neglect of the nature of public investments has created a pattern of
socializing risks while privatizing rewards, preventing innovation
policy from realizing its full potential (Mazzucato, 2013, 2017, 2018;
Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013) In turn, acknowledging state risk-
taking implies accepting that most attempts to create new businesses
are likely to fail. Occasional successes come through trial and error. As
a result, scholars have pointed to the advantages of conceiving public
investments as a portfolio (Mazzucato, 2013; Rodrik, 2015; Stiglitz,
2015) so the state can also benefit from the potential financial rewards,
recover from losses and continue to fund further rounds.
3.4. The legal-institutional dimension of market co-creating and shaping
Attention to the institutional and legal foundations of markets can
reveal an essential dimension of policy-making, implementation and
assessment. Legal institutionalism sheds light on state agencies’ ability
to create, change, use and sustain legal rules, procedures and contracts
that contribute to socially desirable and democratically legitimized
innovation policy objectives. Admitting that institutionalization is the
product of state design and of shared norms and values at a point in
time, this approach makes it possible to consider those legitimation
processes underlying a risk-taking state. Thus, the conditions for en-
abling adequate institutional alternatives and consensus-building be-
come more important than determining the constraints to market
creation and shaping.
Consistent with the above, a dynamic and context-dependent ana-
lysis of the different forms and functions of legal and institutional ar-
rangements takes priority over a static comparison with the best set of
rules for optimal markets. Such analysis provides for a more nuanced
appreciation of the limits, tensions and possibilities of public and pri-
vate collaboration throughout the innovation and policy processes.
Integrating these ideas into this new framework opens the way for new
analytical tools that can be used to deal with real-world policy chal-
lenges, such as the potential mismatches between the risks taken and
rewards realized by actors participating in public–private partnerships.
4 In this regard, legal institutionalism is consistent with the political econo-
mists’ remarks that the promotion of economic development requires institu-
tions to fulfill specific functions, which are better served by certain institutional
forms (Andreoni and Chang, 2019).
5 As Schumpeter (1934) stressed, even when entrepreneurs invest their own
resources in R&D, they absorb the risks of failure in the capacity of financiers,
not entrepreneurs.
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4. Socializing the risks and rewards of public investment:
elements for a portfolio approach
The allocation of risks and rewards in public–private partnerships
offers a unique lens through which to observe the division of innovative
labor, perceptions about the ‘failure’ and ‘success’ of public invest-
ments, and expected returns. It makes it possible to look into actual
mechanisms whereby the state, on behalf of citizens, seeks to reap a
share of the financial rewards and, thus, use instruments to appropriate
returns that go beyond the prescriptions of market failure theory.
Nevertheless, certain limitations need to be recognized, given that
public and private contributions are closely intertwined (Nelson, 2005).
Because innovation is inherently uncertain, and investments have
no guaranteed return, enhancing public control over any arising re-
wards is a necessary, albeit secondary, condition for legitimizing the
state’s role in creating and shaping markets. Within a framework that
sees public agencies as capable of absorbing high technological and
market risks, there is a valid expectation that the fruits of successful
public finance will serve the taxpayers and therefore provide a rationale
for also socializing the financial rewards achieved (Lazonick and
Mazzucato, 2013).
Market failure theory assumes that the state already recoups re-
wards via job creation, knowledge spillovers, increased living standards
and tax revenues. However, it ignores concrete limitations in those
mechanisms. Patents granted broadly and upstream end up blocking or
slowing down knowledge spillovers, either of which can harm follow-
up innovations (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). Similarly, when com-
panies avoid or evade tax payment, the state is unlikely to reap enough
fiscal surplus to enable its redistributive function. Furthermore, the
mainstream approach has no explanation for a variety of instruments
that public agencies eventually consider in seeking to link risks and
financial rewards. A market co-creating and shaping approach in-
corporates the view that these government initiatives are an intrinsic
dimension of investment process and strategy.
As this framework focuses on innovation policy that is oriented
towards critical societal needs, the socialization of rewards can be un-
derstood as an attempt to balance financial returns and broader eco-
nomic and social benefits. Thus, the framework enables a distinction to
be made between two sets of complementary, yet sometimes conflicting
practical measures: profit-sharing and conditionalities.
4.1. Profit-sharing policy instruments
In neoclassical economics, business profits often mean the “rewards
for innovation and risk-taking” (Samuelson, 1997). Conversely, if the
state plays a lead entrepreneurial (investor-of- first-resort) role, it
would be reasonable for public agencies to share in the profits.
Claiming a share of the financial gains of public investments, beyond
taxation, makes it possible to compensate for the inevitable losses
(given the high uncertainties involved) and continue to invest in future
innovation. Therefore, it could help to create a revolving fund, as in the
case of private venture capital portfolios.
One advantage of profit-sharing mechanisms over taxing concerns
the potential for attaining a more stable source of public funding and
having a higher impact on the direction of innovation. A revolving fund
allows public agencies to enhance their discretion over, and in-
dependence from, budget funds. Furthermore, governments can design
and manage the recoupment of revenues more flexibly than they could
through taxes. Besides being essential for the alignment of private and
public actor’s interests, flexibility prevents harm being done to sup-
ported firms (Enke, 1967). Having the state retain a share of business
profits arising from successful innovations can help to build consensus
around the public sector’s role and performance (Windus and Schiffel,
1976). As a public portfolio leaves a traceable record of supported
projects and firms, and gains and losses, it offers an objective measure
of success against which public managers can be held to account
(Mazzucato, 2016).
Failure of public funding, for any reason, is often considered in-
dicative of an inability to ‘pick winners’ or ‘distortion' of (otherwise
optimal) markets (Owen, 2012). Yet many of the successes go unnoticed
and even result in public rewards being privatized. The US Department
of Energy (DoE) attracted criticism for providing a guaranteed loan of
$528 million to the solar-power start-up company Solyndra, which
went bankrupt once the price of silicon chips fell dramatically, leaving
taxpayers to pick up the bill (Wood, 2012). However, few critics ac-
knowledged that a similar guaranteed loan ($465 million) supported
Tesla for the development of the Model S electric car, which led to
success; even fewer have ever questioned why the government accepted
early payment of the underlying loan (earning $12 million back) in-
stead of negotiating stock options that could have been worth almost
$1.4 billion (Woolley, 2013). Had the DoE chosen the stock options, the
royalties retained could have not only covered the Solyndra losses
many times over but also been used to continue to fund promising
Fig. 1. Sources of public and private finance along the innovation chain (US).
Source: Authors’ adaptation of underlying figure by (Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003).NSF, National Science Foundation; NIH, National Institutes of Health; DARPA,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; SBIR, Small Business Innovation Research Program; NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; InQtel
(venture capital firm funded by the CIA, Central Intelligence Agency).
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ventures (Mazzucato, 2013) while signaling the importance of gov-
ernment’s high-risk funding for achieving renewable-energy technolo-
gies.
The above example also exposes the set of strategic decisions that
policymakers face regarding the selection of profit-sharing mechanisms
suitable for each context. Table 1 illustrates how the design of financing
instruments for supporting innovation downstream (the first two col-
umns) entails choices regarding how and to what extent public in-
vestors may be able to capture financial rewards (third and fourth
columns).
Profit-sharing mechanisms may include: repayable grants with
profit-sharing via royalties on sales or equity stakes; public venture
capital funds enabling royalties on equity; debt financing convertible
into equity; and other sorts of fund-mixing elements of equity and debt
(OECD, 2014). Through these various instruments, the state seeks to
attract private investments by mitigating the risks of innovation. A
critical distinction concerns the risk spectrum. While grants, for in-
stance, may address fundamental uncertainty and technology risk at
early-stage R&D projects, the stakes are higher for state-owned venture
capital, because it reaches the more capital-intensive stage of tech-
nology development in which, though less uncertain than upstream, the
market risks are extremely high. Consequently, the revenue basis upon
which public and private actors agree to share is significantly different,
ranging from a low-value basis (IPR) to high-value (capital gains), as
the Solyndra vs. Tesla case illustrates.
The choice of policy instrument or ‘mix’ should also consider
practical issues. Through grants, for example, public agencies can
benefit from wide possibilities to control the course of the project
(Rothgang et al., 2003); however, the exposure to rent seeking, mis-
allocation and abuse, is substantial. In contrast, venture capital allows
the creation of new business actors, or the strengthening of existing
ones, who are willing to invest in socially desirable areas. Here too
there is high risk in relation to the successful exit and public agencies
are required to incur in great monitoring efforts (Rothgang et al., 2003);
an excessive focus in short-term profits is also a risk. It is important,
therefore, that the selection of instruments takes into account not only
the policy objectives, but also the capabilities of public agencies to deal
with the issues mentioned above. In practice, the main strategic or-
ientation that derives from our framework, concerns the composition of
a public investment portfolio that allows to diversify both the risk and
reward potential across different types of projects, firms and industries,
rather than ‘picking winners’ by making bets on a few firms ex ante.
This requires the state choosing a broadly defined direction—such as
the digital or green revolution—supporting the basic infrastructure
while also providing the patient long term funding to those businesses.
In this context, the issue is not funding particular sizes of companies
(e.g. SMEs) but any company—including larger ones—willing and able
to invest and innovate towards meeting a public goal such as the de-
velopment of carbon neutral regions.
A key question is how long the state should stay in the investment,
and when the optimal exit strategy might be. Ensuring investments with
different maturation times (including those in large companies with
more stable dividends), and exit strategies that allow governments to
stay long enough to recoup rewards proportionally to the risks taken, is
crucial to sustain continuous long-term public investments.
Although state-owned banks adopt many profit-sharing instruments,
the market-failure approach often takes them as distortions. From a
market co-creating and shaping perspective, public financial institu-
tions are authentic mechanisms for socializing the risks and rewards of
investments (Mazzucato, 2013). By definition, banks are structured to
operate with an expectation of return and to manage investments
through a portfolio approach. They retain equity when running venture
capital support while eventually benefitting from windfall gains, as
corroborated by evidence on state-owned banks in Brazil, China and
Germany (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). Alternatively, even less risky
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corporate bonds. Besides, for state-owned banks typically operating a
wide range of financing instruments, it is plausible to assume that they
are also in a privileged position to innovate in the design of those in-
struments so as to compensate for the risks absorbed. Using a market
co-creating and shaping framework ensures that questions are asked
about what lessons can be drawn from development banks to help the
broader range of public agencies that fund innovation to develop a
coherent portfolio approach.
Such an approach also allows us to envision new challenges for
successful policy implementation. One key issue is to enable long-ter-
mism through adequate reward structures. Another, is to ensure a re-
couping state does not shy away from reinvesting with a clear public
purpose. Developing institutional and governance structures that are fit
for these is yet another area that deserves attention.
4.2. Policy instruments involving conditionalities
Recognizing the importance of balancing risks and financial rewards
does not mean neglecting the core objective of innovation policy, which
is to generate tangible economic and social benefits. A market co-
creating and shaping framework departs from the premise that social
returns will naturally emerge and shed new light on actual institutional
designs, policies and practices that contribute to a productive en-
vironment for innovation. In this context, typical industrial policy
measures such as conditionalities tied to the allocation of public funds
can be understood as active attempts to enable innovation to flourish
while steering benefits directly to society. Examples of such con-
ditionalities are the pricing of final goods and services, knowledge
governance and reinvestment in innovation and local production, and
these are discussed below.
4.2.1. Pricing
Supported innovations, especially essential public goods and ser-
vices, must be affordable and accessible to fulfill an investor-of-first-
resort role of the state. Otherwise, taxpayers may end up paying the
taxes that enabled public investments in R&D and infrastructure, and
again for high prices when these downplay the state’s contribution to
the former (Alperovitz and Daly, 2009). Pricing regulations for mono-
polistic industries of the kind enacted as a law in the United Sates, but
not yet implemented, can mitigate this problem. The 1980 Bayh-Dole
Act includes a pricing cap provision named ‘march-in rights.’6 This rule
provides public agencies that supported an invention with powers to
license it to a third party if, among other causes, the patent-holder does
not take steps to achieve practical use. An example of the rule in action
is that the requirement on the practical application of research results
regarding new drugs that benefitted from public funding demands
‘reasonable’ (accessible and affordable) prices (Davis and Arno, 2001).
4.2.2. Knowledge governance
The history of mission-driven public finance shows that the creation
and diffusion of knowledge in priority areas were not spontaneous, but
heavily reliant on the decisions of public funding agencies. The US
military sector illustrates that the use of public procurement can furnish
the government with leverage that enables it to steer the development
of strategic technologies under an open science and collaborative en-
vironment (Mowery, 2009). Ensuring that information was available
and accessible, procurement stimulated dynamic and persistent ex-
changes among and within multiple organizations, favoring learning
and high spillover effects. In any case, the scope for positive spillover
depends on the stage of technology development – declining as tech-
nologies mature – and the design of missions and projects in question:
the more sectors involved, the higher the synergies (Mazzucato, 2018).
4.2.3. Reinvestment
Instead of assuming that economic growth and job creation will
ensue, a market co-creating and shaping approach sees the materi-
alization of those expectations as associated with the sustainability of
investments in innovation and local production. If business profits are
hoarded or mainly used for short-term, low-risk and high-return fi-
nancialization purposes, the expected effect on employment will be
reduced. This interpretation offers a foundation for steering business
investments into productive economic activities. A real alternative is to
enforce regulations establishing obligations for firms to reinvest in in-
novation. Since the late 1990s, Brazil has implemented legislation
mandating public and private companies in previously privatized sec-
tors to reinvest a share of their profits into public R&D funds.7 A similar
obligation gave rise to the Bell Labs when US antitrust authorities or-
dered AT&T to invest in R&D in order to continue benefitting from a
telephone industry monopoly. There is also plentiful evidence of gov-
ernments taking a more active stance towards local manufacturing,
which was closely linked with the opportunities for job creation. Fur-
thermore, the Bayh-Dole Act brought a requirement for products em-
bodying the results of publicly funded R&D to be manufactured sub-
stantially in the United States.8
4.2.4. Other conditions
Baumol’s (1990) work on the different types of entrepreneurship
showed that encouraging ‘productive’ activities may not be enough to
deter or block the ones that are ‘destructive’. In this regard, recognizing
that the state can act as a leading investor gives new meaning to in-
itiatives to protect and manage its (capital and intangible) assets;
however, such initiatives find no justification in a market failure fra-
mework. Managers of public venture capital funds, like their private
counterparts, contemplate the option of upholding preferred stocks or
golden shares in individual firms as a way of protecting state-owned
capital assets. Preferred stocks enable priority in receiving dividends,
high rates and warrants, whereas a golden share empowers the vetoing
of key corporate events (mergers, liquidations, asset sales, etc.) when
these are deemed detrimental to society. The UK Government has
widely adopted both types of measures to avoid hostile takeovers of
privatized firms and foreign companies gaining full control (Jones
et al., 1999). However, in the context of active entrepreneurial states,
such measures have received renewed attention, as has the protection
and management of intangible assets held in the public sector. Because
of the UK government’s Industrial Strategy, the Treasury has published
a report on this matter (HM Treasury, 2018).
As the literature on the entrepreneurial state and various scholars
propose, the mix of profit-sharing policy instruments and those invol-
ving conditionalities can be re-interpreted as incipient, often ad-hoc
attempts to fulfill the reward function of a portfolio approach to public
funding. By analogy with business management practices, seeing public
investments as a bundle, instead of individual units, means spreading
the risk across individual programs, R&D projects, directions of search
and types of firms, enabling exploration of multiple pathways while
enhancing the chances of success (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 1999;
Mazzucato, 2013). Our framework highlights the importance of di-
versifying not just risks, but also reward mechanisms, thus moving
beyond the market-failure approach and providing decision-makers
with core elements with which to devise a portfolio strategy. This
makes it possible to assess these practices more systematically and
derive the relevant lessons that can guide better policies.
6 35 U.S. Code § 203 (“March-in rights”).
7 Law 11540/07 enacted the National Science and Technology Development
Fund (FNDCT) and sectoral R&D funds while establishing a mandatory re-
quirement for profit reinvestment in R&D in selected areas.
8 35 U.S. Code § 204 (“Preference for United States industry”).
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4.3. The legal and institutional foundations of symbiotic ecosystems
So far, the analysis has indicated economic reasons for balancing
risks and rewards of public investments, showing that they involve,
among other factors, the mobilization of resources in the legal domain,
for example, through attempted changes in legal rules and contracts. At
this point, it is useful to widen the view of the role of legal institutions
in the economy and society. The fact that their development is depen-
dent on state powers adds to the explanation of how and to what extent
the socialization of risks and rewards will occur.
One consequence of the market co-creating and shaping framework
is that attention on exchanges among private owners shifts to market
interactions, especially public–private partnerships for financing in-
novation. Accordingly, the relevant analytical and policy problem re-
garding the functions of underlying contracts and rules is the extent to
which an institutional environment favors and sustains widespread
collaborations, dynamism and market creation. The equity of the dis-
tribution of rewards of public–private partnerships and the rules that fit
that purpose are essential dimensions of that process.
Research on developmental states and legal institutionalism points
towards seeing the risk–reward nexus as a social, political and legal
construction, whereby the state plays an active and constitutive role
(Polanyi, 1944; Evans, 1995; Deakin et al., 2017). The framework
makes it possible to locate the decisions regarding the adoption of
profit-sharing policy instruments and conditionalities in the dynamics
and tensions among state powers, within and across public organiza-
tions, and, in between these, the private sector and citizens. In this way,
the framework goes beyond emphasizing the importance of stability,
clarity and predictability of the rules underpinning economic activity as
devices for mitigating uncertainties. It adds that signaling values such
as trust and fairness are functions that the law should play. Therefore,
an institutional environment only supports the risk–reward nexus of
public–private partnerships when the key stakeholders perceive it as
such.
Rather than natural or neutral, as construed in neoclassical eco-
nomics, legal and institutional frameworks mediate private and public
appropriation of rewards. In this sense, the ‘winner takes all’ mindset
results from political and legal choices, as illustrated by high-tech in-
dustries in the United States. Besides the changes in IPR legislation, the
emergence of a special court to handle patent appeals meant that courts
could play an active role. However, it is debatable whether expanding
patent subject matters into living organisms was necessary for at-
tracting business into biotech (Eisenberg, 2006). In ICT, judges and
regulators loosened copyrights and privacy regulations - justified by
freedom of speech but resulting in a de facto industrial policy (Chander,
2013). Similarly, publicly funded activities in defense and aerospace,
such as those targeting low-Earth orbit, seem to be moving toward
expanded private appropriability (Mazzucato and Robinson, 2018),
along with efforts to create more equitable public–private partnerships.
To the extent that financial relations involve power, the outcomes
depend on the unfolding of negotiations, bargaining and compromising
(Pistor, 2009). The Bayh-Dole Act originally contained a provision that
entitled the US Treasury to recoup a share of the profits realized upon
publicly funded research, but only above a certain threshold. Never-
theless, this provision was removed due to the economic downturn,
political reasons and concerns regarding the bureaucratic costs for
implementation (Herder, 2008). In contrast, Israel exemplifies an in-
vestor-of-first-resort state that co-evolves with legal and institutional
structures that enable public rewards to be enhanced. The Innovation
Law of 1984 requires successfully supported projects to repay royalties
on sales to the Innovation Authority. Israel is also famous for the po-
sitive experience of the government’s performance as a venture capi-
talist through the Yozma Fund, which yielded returns via equity
(Avnimelech, 2009). These various arrangements across and within
countries reinforces the need to deepen the knowledge on the instru-
ments appropriate for each context to support strategic decision-
making.
While one could interpret some of these policies using market
failure theory (for example, asymmetric information causing in-
complete contracts among private actors), it is hard to justify the bu-
reaucratic burden of profit-sharing contracts involving venture capital
or royalties purely on those grounds. The function-based approach to
systems of innovation offers a more useful explanation, underscoring
legitimation processes as a prerequisite for the emergence of new
technology innovation systems (Bergek et al., 2008). However, the
focus on individual technologies, and on the premise that business
drives innovation offers limited analysis of the challenges for leading
public agencies to shape how their role as investors can be legitimated.
A market-co-creating and shaping framework shed light on the devel-
opment of this role, because within it is the concept that governments’
efforts to build more equitable public–private partnerships are an in-
tegral part of legitimacy-building.
Mazzucato (2013) has distinguished between two ideal types of
innovation ecosystems – symbiotic and parasitic. Derived from a com-
parison to biological communities, the term ‘innovation ecosystem’
describes the functionality of the economic dynamics of the network of
relationships between the multiple actors and institutions collaborating
for R&D and innovation. The term complements the notion of ‘systems
of innovation’ by highlighting the nature of those relationships. An
innovation ecosystem is symbiotic if it is rooted in mutually beneficial
legal relationships, in which increased profits accruing from innovation
enable public and private investors to replenish funds and continue to
invest in new rounds (Mazzucato, 2013). A crucial ingredient is the
perception that the environment at stake is virtuous and equitable. A
parasitic ecosystem is rooted in legal relationships in which one actor
benefits at the expense of the others. It tends to expand the private
appropriability of financial gains obtained with public support, thus
favoring ‘winner takes all’. The symbiotic/parasitic dichotomy is useful
in any analysis of current systems and for informing the direction of
change.
Table 2 summarizes the features of formal rules and contracts sus-
taining symbiotic and parasitic ecosystems. While the contrast suggests
two opposite poles, the reality is more complicated. Between the two,
there is a continuum of hybrid ecosystems rooted in public - private
contractual relationships that combine the two types. Hence, one can
consider a hypothetical spectrum of change between the two extremes.
The concrete examples in this section indicate limits and possibi-
lities for state action institutionalizing, through the law, more equitable
reward structures. Such examples are a start towards identifying the
conditions that encourage symbiotic ecosystems. Analysis of these and
other experiences could lead to useful lessons for public agencies in
how to design new policy instruments and shape symbiotic relation-
ships. After all, experimentation is crucial to the accumulation of the
powers to do this effectively.
5. Conclusion, main implications and areas for future research
In this paper we have presented a new approach to innovation
policy that complements the market-failure rationale. Public invest-
ments are at the center of the innovation process because of their role of
co-creating and shaping markets with businesses. Also, legal rules,
procedures and contracts play a constitutive role and the state’s action
is strategic for steering the institutional environment in those directions
that allow for the realization of socially desirable policy goals. By
making explicit the leading role of the state as an investor and enabler
of institutional change, this approach allows public agencies to be
conceived as actors entitled to seek to appropriate a share of the re-
wards of the innovations to which they contribute. In other words, it
becomes possible to understand and analyze how governments, when
acting along the innovation chain, may attempt to socialize both the
risks and rewards of public investments – a question that has been only
narrowly considered under a market-failure framework. The analytical
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and policy implications suggest interesting avenues for future research.
Recognition of the risk-taking entrepreneurial role of the state
provides initial justification for public funding agencies’ attempts to
recoup some of the financial rewards realized, beyond taxation. Sharing
rewards with private actors enables a more ‘portfolio’ mindset – where
the upside is used to cover the downside – and more stable funding to
serve citizens’ needs. Emphasis on the legal-institutional dimension
sheds light on additional functions for measures such as royalties,
equity stakes, pricing capping mechanisms or other conditionalities,
which remain invisible in the mainstream approach. In democratic
societies, these can be understood as means of attempting to balance
asymmetric power relations, tensions and conflicting views among
multiple stakeholders, while building a shared notion of the value and
legitimacy of the state. On the basis of this conception, we have refined
the notion of innovation ecosystems in terms of the risk − reward
nexus in public − private partnerships. While accepted equitable
agreements lay the foundations for symbiotic ecosystems, parasitic ones
encourage ‘winner takes all’, at the expense of society.
We identified two sets of legal measures through which public
agencies could seek an adequate return on investment. Profit-sharing
enables recoupment of potential financial gains in proportion to the
risks undertaken. Conditionalities target tangible benefits to society
regarding the pricing of essential goods and services, access to and
diffusion of new knowledge, job creation, etc. Although not meant to be
exhaustive, this distinction reveals several legal instruments and prac-
tices fitting the two broad types of measures, instead of a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach. This aspect highlights an opportunity for further thinking
on new instruments – and corresponding governance schemes – capable
of ensuring that the state, representing the public, has the possibility of
capturing a fair share of rewards. Pursuing a better understanding of
the functioning of and interactions between those measures in gov-
ernments’ policy mixes may also be a worthwhile path.
The legal-political processes that influence the institutionalization
of initiatives to socialize rewards offer another way of grasping the
complexity behind risk-and-reward distributions. Recognizing this
processes are intertwined, and that the state power is intrinsic to them,
uncovers key challenges. Consensus-building takes time and effort, as it
involves multiple actors, asymmetric powers, different interests and
actors operating under various rules etc. Potential solutions will not
always work: they reflect the possible agreement. Thus, experimenta-
tion, learning and flexibility are critical for institutional and legal de-
sign.
The benefits of advancing a market co-creating and shaping fra-
mework for innovation policy seem clear in the face of contemporary
societal challenges. While empirical studies could help to enrich and
expand the analytical tools discussed in this paper, this new approach
also offers guiding principles for policy design, implementation and
evaluation.
First, our analysis suggests the importance of improving the targets
of public investments to develop a clear public purpose and to state
expected benefits to society through defining missions, goals and
measures of progress. Extending the use of mission-oriented initiatives,
and nurturing the capabilities to do so, are important for legitimizing a
risk-taking state; however also required are adequate institutional me-
chanisms to enable open and broad participation in deliberations re-
garding the directions of change (Stirling, 2008).
Second, the framework indicates the advantages of pursuing a
portfolio approach to structure long-term public investments, as it al-
lows public agencies to spread the risks while ensuring an upside in the
event of success that could provide for a continuous funding source. A
direct nexus between risks and rewards is instrumental in forming and
managing a portfolio. Thus, policymakers should aim to develop a
strategy for achieving a balanced risk–reward nexus, which defines
priorities and brings coherence to the measures to recoup rewards while
keeping in view their public missions.
Third, the framework emphasizes the importance of contemplating
the design of legal and institutional structures that underpin an equi-
table sharing of rewards between actors in the public and private sec-
tors, as part of the process of market creation and shaping. Public
agencies should be allowed to come close to the private sector and
explore the different legal instruments available, in order to identify
which are more appropriate for building symbiotic partnerships.
Besides encouraging creativity, this may involve raising awareness of,
and negotiating with, actors in the state legal apparatus, such as
Table 2
Features of the legal underpinning of the distribution of rewards in public–private partnerships: parasitic versus symbiotic ecosystems (selected examples of how
public actors can capture rewards).
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Parasitic Symbiotic
Risk - reward nexus Imbalanced Balanced
Favouring private appropriability Favouring public appropriability
Private appropriation Rewards captured as profits and capital gains (increase
in asset value), but they lead to ‘winner takes all’
Profits and capital gains still relevant, but shared more equitably
among actors who contributed to the innovation process
Public appropriation Passive Active
Via conditionalities (legal measures to ensure
tangible benefits to society)
Rewards are natural, spontaneous and gradually
accrued from competition through:
Rewards targeted, steered and sustained through conditionalities on:
▪ Pricing controls for public goods/services (access and
affordability to all);▪ Improved living standards for consumers;
▪ Targeted, mission-driven benefits (qualitative requirements for
‘public good’ provision)
▪ Diffused benefits of ‘public good’ provision and
positive externalities;
▪ Knowledge governance (access to and diffusion of the crucial
knowledge for tackling societal challenges)
▪ Knowledge creation and spillovers;
▪ Local manufacturing to stimulate productive entrepreneurship
and job creation within the country/region
▪ Job creation
▪ Profit reinvestment on R&D to continuously stimulate
productive investments and virtuous ecosystems
▪ Avoidance or blocking of dilution/liquidation of state-owned
capital assets (preferred stocks, golden shares etc.)
Via profit-sharing (legal measures to enhance
financial rewards to the state)
Limited to the taxation of profits or capital gains Beyond taxation, financial rewards recouped via:
▪ Reimbursement of public funds (partial or total);
▪ Public sharing of profits (e.g. royalties, levies on sales);
▪ Public sharing of capital gains (e.g. equity convertible bonds or
hybrid financing instruments mixing equity and debt)
Legal framework Allows public funding and assumes recoupment will
follow
▪ Allows public funding plus recoupment (via conditionalities and
profit-sharing)
▪ Allows public funding and makes recoupment mandatory
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legislators, regulators, judges and auditing bodies.
Together, the above-mentioned aspects suggest the need to promote
the development and accumulation of capabilities in the public sector.
Empowering governments to design, implement and assess practices for
dealing with the risk–reward nexus is the key to shifting the con-
temporary pattern of socializing the risks while privatizing the rewards.
Only appropriate capacity-building can invigorate hopes for inclusive,
innovation-led growth.
To some extent, the success of innovation policies led by en-
trepreneurial states depends on the responses that stakeholders may
provide to the questions we have posed in our framework. However, it
should be noted that this approach assigns an important role to con-
textual factors. This means that risk-taking capacity in the public sector,
missions with a clear public purpose and that are outcomes of partici-
patory political processes, robust but flexible legal and institutional
frameworks, and continuous reinvestment of public rewards are some
of the preconditions for effective implementation (Laplane, 2019).
While these cannot and should not be taken for granted anywhere, the
degree to which such conditions may be present (or lacking) in various
developed and developing country contexts is expected to differ. While
it is evident that developing countries with weaker states may have
greater challenges in developing public sector capabilities, it is also true
that they have more of a history in considering conditionalities attached
to foreign direct investment (Chang, 2002b). Such conditionalities
could be transformed to be just as much about innovation as they are
currently about development. In this sense, it is precisely developing
countries that could benefit the most from a policy learning that enables
socializing the risks and rewards of public investments.
Empirical research on incipient policy experiments in Brazil shows
that, under certain circumstances, the above conditioning factors can be
nurtured (Laplane, 2019). This evidence suggests that the framework is,
therefore, applicable to developing countries. Future research should
expand the analysis of the concrete experiences at different settings,
including developing countries, to enable more insights into the chal-
lenges and opportunities for successful policy implementation and to
enhance the explanatory power of the framework. Drawing the relevant
lessons from existing experiences will be useful for building a richer
evidence-base to inform decision-making and better practices.
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